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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, the solidary obligor who satisfies the
underlying solidary obligation has the right to seek contribution from non-settling
solidary co-obligors. Louisiana jurisprudence, however, is in a state of some
disarray regarding the proper method for preserving contribution rights after
settlement. The two lines of decisions on point require contradictory actions by the
settling obligor. This legal uncertainty poses a serious problem for settling parties
and their lawyers, so serious that it merits the attention of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. This article outlines the conflicting lines ofjurisprudence and suggests an
analysis and course of action for legal counsel based upon Civil Code rules of legal
subrogation and contribution.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Civil Code
Under Louisiana law, the right of "contribution" arises from principles of legal
subrogation and solidarity. Louisiana Civil Code article 1829 provides, in part, that
"[s]ubrogation takes place by operation of law... [i]n favor of an obligor who pays
a debt he owes with others or for others and who has recourse against those others
as a result of the payment.. . ." Similarly, Article 1804 provides in part that "[a]
solidary obligor who has rendered the whole performance, though subrogated to the
right of the obligee, may claim from the other obligors no more than the virile
portion of each."
Under Article 1804, if the underlying solidary obligation arises from an offense
or quasi-offense, the "virile portion" of each solidary obligor is proportionate to its
fault as judicially determined at trial of the contribution claim. If the underlying
obligation arises from a contract or quasi-contract, each obligor's virile portion is
equal "in the absence of agreement or judgment to the contrary." If the solidary
obligation thus satisfied "concem[s] only one of the obligors," as when a
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vicariously or constructively liable obligor satisfies the debt of the primary obligor,
Article 1804 grants a right of full recoupment from the primary obligor.'
B. The Devil in the Details
Beginning with the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Morris v.
Kospelich2 almost thirty years ago, Louisiana courts have consistently recognized
that solidary co-obligors may settle with the claimant while preserving the right to
seek contribution from non-paying solidary co-obligors.3 The decisions of
Louisiana's intermediate appellate courts, however, have fallen into a state of
confusion on how the settlement must be structured to preserve contribution rights.
Under one line of appellate decisions, the "partial release" cases, the settling party
loses its right of contribution from other responsible parties if the entire claim is
compromised. By contrast, another line of decisions, the "total release" line,
requires the settling party to obtain a full release of all responsible parties in order
to preserve contribution rights against those parties.
C. The "Partial Release" Decisions
The "partial release" decisions hold that to preserve contribution rights against
non-paying obligors, the settling party must preserve-not compromise-the
claimant's rights against non-settling solidary co-obligors. These decisions are
based on the rationale that because contribution stems from legal subrogation to the
obligee's rights, the compromise of the obligee's entire claim against all solidary
obligors extinguishes any rights that could have been subrogated to the settling
obligor. Under this view, a full release of all claims eliminates the settling
obligor's contribution rights, while a partial release of only the settling obligor's
portion preserves those rights.4
The first circuit followed this reasoning in U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Safeco Insurance Co.5 The court held that a settlement agreement by which the
1. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 1805, a solidary obligor may enforce contribution rights
prior to satisfaction or compromise of the principal claim through third party demands against
solidary co-obligors. If the principal claim is not compromised before trial, the virile portions of the
solidary obligors are adjudicated along with the principal claim. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812 C;
Ducote v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620
So. 2d 877 (1993); Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1985).
2. 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316 (1969).
3. See generally Ducote, 616 So. 2d at 1366; Green v. Pesson Plumbing & Heating Co., 599 So.
2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Illinois Cent. Gulf R. v. Deaton, Inc., 581 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 1117 (1991); Pitre v. Ecko Housewares Co., 521 So. 2d 563 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1988); U.S. Fidelity &. Guar. Co. v. Safeco. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982); Diggs, 772 F.2d at 190 (applying Louisiana Law).
4. See Illinois Cent. GulfR.R. Co., 581 So. 2d at 714; Green, 599 So. 2d at 493; US. Fidelity
&. Guar. Co., 420 So. 2d at 484.
5. 420 So. 2d at 487.
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plaintiffs were deemed to have released all claims against all potential joint
tortfeasors defeated both legal and conventional subrogation of the claims to the
settling defendants. The settling defendants therefore had no rights of contribu-
tion against non-settling joint tortfeasors'
Similarly, in Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Deaton,7 the fourth circuit,
citing the Safeco decision, held that the plaintiff's general release of all personal
injury claims prevented legal or conventional subrogation of the claims and
thereby extinguished the settling defendant's contribution rights against non-
settling joint tortfeasors. The court concluded, nonetheless, that the settling
defendant, who was later absolved of fault, retained a right of indemnification
from the culpable tortfeasor under principles of unjust enrichment.8 Under the
court's reasoning, this right of indemnification, predicated upon the theory that
the culpable co-obligor is unjustly enriched by the innocent obligor's discharge
of his obligation, would be available only to a settling obligor found to be free
of actual fault or merely "constructively" or "technically" liable.9 The Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to review the Deaton decision.'0
The third circuit reached the same result in Green v. Pesson Plumbing &
Heating Co.," holding that the obligee's general release of all potential obligors
extinguished any rights that could have been subrogated or assigned to the
settling obligor. As in Deaton, the court observed that the settling obligor might
have a right of indemnification against the culpable co-obligors, but only after
the settling obligor had been absolved of actual fault. 2
Under the "partial release" decisions, failing to preserve the underlying claim
against non-settling obligors defeats legal subrogation and extinguishes rights of
contribution. The settling obligor who wishes to reserve contribution rights must
secure the release of only its own liability, along with a conventional assignment
or subrogation of the plaintiff's remaining claims against non-released co-
obligors. 3 The agreement should expressly reserve the settling obligor's rights
to seek contribution and indemnification from non-settling co-obligors.
D. The "Total Release" Decisions
The "total release" decisions require precisely opposite actions by the settling
solidary obligor. Under these precedents, the settling obligor who desires to
6. Id. at 486-87.
7. 581 So. 2d at 716.
8. Id. at 716-18.
9. Id. The indemnification claim also is addressed in Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 193 (5th
Cit. 1985); and Pitre v. Ecko Housewares Co., 521 So. 2d 563, 568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
10. 588 So. 2d 1117 (La. 1991).
11. 599 So. 2d 492, 493 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 493.
13. See Green, 599 So. 2d at 493; Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Deaton, Inc., 581 So. 2d 714,
716 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 1117 (1991); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 484, 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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preserve contribution rights must obtain the release of the entire claim against all
solidary co-obligors 4 These decisions follow the rationale that an obligor who
settles only his own liability is presumed to have paid no more than a "virile
share" under Article 1804. Hence, the obligor is not legally subrogated to the
claimant's rights against non-released co-obligors and has no right of contribution
from them. 5
In Diggs v. Hood,16 the United States Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law,
held that a settling tortfeasor's compromise of only his own liability and the
plaintiff's preservation of rights against non-released joint tortfeasors prevented
legal or conventional subrogation of the plaintiff's claims. Because the
settlement did not discharge any portion of the solidary debt owed by the non-
settling tortfeasors, the settlement provided no contribution rights to the settling
obligor.
The first circuit, citing Diggs, applied the same analysis in Pitre v. Ecko
Housewares Co., 7 concluding that a settlement agreement which released only
the settling tortfeasor, but purported to partially subrogate him to the plaintiff's
claims against non-released joint tortfeasors only to the extent of the settlement
payment, failed to effect either legal or conventional subrogation of any of the
plaintiff s claims. The settling tortfeasor therefore received no right of
contribution against non-settling joint tortfeasors. The court distinguished the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Morris v. Kospelich8 on the ground that
in that case, the joint tortfeasor had compromised the plaintiff's "entire" claim
and hence had received a right of contribution against non-settling tortfeasors.19
More recently, the third circuit, in Ducote v. Commercial Union Insurance
Co.,2° without citing its earlier "partial release" decision in Green,2 held that
a settlement agreement releasing the plaintiffs claims against all potential
tortfeasors, and reserving the settling tortfeasor's contribution and indemnity
claims against non-settling joint tortfeasors, legally subrogated the plaintiffs
claims to the settling tortfeasor and vested him with rights of contribution.22
The Ducote court succinctly stated the central proposition of the "total release"
cases:
In order for appellees to be legally subrogated to the rights of plaintiffs,
the settlement must have been for the entire debt and not just to satisfy
14. See generally Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law); Pitre
v. Ecko Housewares Co., 521 So. 2d 563, 566 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Ducote v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 877 (1993).
15. See analysis in Diggs, 772 F.2d at 194; and Ducote, 616 So. 2d at 1370.
16. 772 F.2d at 194.
17. 521 So. 2d at 567 & n.3.
18. 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316 (1969).
19. Pitre, 521 So. 2d at 567.
20. 616 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 877 (1993).
21. 599 So. 2d 492, 493 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
22. Ducote, 616 So. 2d at 1370-71.
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appellees [sic] portion-an event which, if proved true; would extin-
guish appellees' claim for contribution.23
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review of the Ducote decision.
E. Between a Rock and a Hard Place
The two lines of decisions appear impossible to reconcile. A solidary
obligor who settles with the claimant in accordance with the "partial release"
decisions risks the loss of contribution rights under the "total release" cases, and
vice versa. This conflicting jurisprudence leaves legal counsel to solidary
obligors unable to advise their clients of a risk-free method of structuring a
settlement agreement so as to preserve contribution rights.
II. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
The Civil Code rests the right of contribution firmly upon the foundation of
legal subrogation.25 Under Articles 1829 and 1804, legal subrogation results
from the discharge of a common obligation "owed with others or for others."2 6
The settling obligor's discharge of all or part of his co-obligor's liability is the
key to legal subrogation and the right of contribution."
The reasoning of the "partial release" decisions conflicts with these
principles. Under Articles 1829 and 1804, the obligee's partial release of only
the settling obligor's liability prevents subrogation of the obligee's remaining
claims. Without having discharged all or part of his solidary co-obligors' debt,
the settling obligor has no ground for seeking contribution of their virile portions
of the debt. Further, if the "partial release" cases are accurate, the non-paying
obligor would simultaneously owe both the original claimant and the settling
obligor for the identical debt. By contrast, the "total release" decisions are
23. Id. at 1370.
24. 620 So. 2d at 877.
25. See Sail Litvinoff, Obligations § 11.55, at 299, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992)
(citing Civil Code articles and jurisprudence) ("Thus, once it is adjudged that two persons who
through their fault caused damage to another are solidarily liable to the victim, the one who pays the
whole benefits from legal subrogation for the contribution he is entitled to recover from the other.").
See also Perkins v. Scaffolding Rental and Erection Serv., Inc., 568 So. 2d 549, 551 (La. 1990) ("The
source of the right to contribution is subrogation.").
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
27. While Louisiana Civil Code article 1804 speaks in terms of the obligor's rendering of the
"whole performance," the discharge of a portion, but not all, of the co-obligor's share of the debt
should effect both legal subrogation and contribution to the extent that the co-obligor's portion has
been satisfied. See the analysis in Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1985), construing
Article 2104, the predecessor to the present Article 1804. ("The Hood interests may claim
contribution from Ford only if their payment to Diggs may in some way discharge part of Ford's
potential liability... Contribution may be demanded only by one who has paid the 'part or portion'
of an obligation for which another is liable.").
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consistent with basic Civil Code rules of legal subrogation and contribution. As
these decisions hold, the compromise and release of the entire claim triggers both
legal subrogation to the settling obligor and the right to contribution from non-
settling solidary co-obligors. 5
IV. WHAT IS A LAWYER To Do?
Until the Louisiana Supreme Court resolves these issues, the settling obligor
runs a risk of losing contribution rights no matter how his legal counsel
structures the settlement documents. In the face of this conflicting jurisprudence,
how should a lawyer proceed? It would seem best to adhere to the Civil Code.
The settlement agreement should recite that the settlement payment is made as
the "whole performance" and in full satisfaction of the claim. The claimant
should accept the payment in full satisfaction and release of his claim against all
obligors, with the intent to legally subrogate to the settling obligor the plaintiff's
rights against all potential obligors. It would not hurt to recite the parties' intent
to comply with Civil Code articles 1829 and 1804. Further, the agreement
should explicitly reserve the settling obligor's rights of contribution and
indemnity against all other potential obligors.
In some circumstances, parties can hedge against the potential application
of the "partial release" precedents by securing a contractual assignment and
conventional subrogation of the underlying claim. If the claim is contractual or
otherwise not "strictly personal" to the claimant, the conventional assignment of
the claim should be structured in accordance with the Civil Code articles
governing the assignment of rights.29
This device is more problematic in the field of personal injury claims. In
Ducote v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,a0 a "total release" decision, the
third circuit held that a personal injury claim is "strictly personal" to the claimant
and hence may not be conventionally assigned.3 The court, however, found
that the settling parties' attempt at a conventional assignment of personal injury
claims evidenced their intent to legally subrogate the claims to the settling
28. See, e.g., Diggs, 772 F.2d at 194, 197; Ducote, 616 So. 2d at 1370.
29. La. Civ. Code arts. 2642-2654. See also Keith v. Comco Ins. Co., 574 So. 2d 1270, 1276
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 16 (1991) (recognizing the effect of a conventional
assignment of contract claims under a settlement agreement).
30. 616 So. 2d at 1369.
31. Id. La. Civ. Code arts. 2642-2654 provide a method for the contractual assignment of rights.
Article 2642, however, provides that rights "pertaining to obligations that are strictly personal" may
not be assigned contractually. Louisiana jurisprudence is fairly well settled on the point that personal
injury claims may not be contractually assigned during the lifetime of the injured party because such
claims are "strictly personal" to the victim. See, e.g., Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 540 So. 2d
391, 393 (La. App. I st Cir. 1989) (noting "well settled" rule prohibiting "transfer of a personal injury
cause of action during the lifetime of the injured party... because of the intensely personal nature
of such actions").
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obligor and to preserve the obligor's contribution rights.3 Hence, even in the
personal injury context, a conventional assignment may help ensure that the
settling party retains its contribution rights.
V. MEASURE OF RECOVERY AFTER SETTLEMENT
Some confusion exists among the district courts as to the measure of
recovery on a contribution claim after discharge of the underlying solidary
obligation. In Ducote,33 for example, the district court awarded the settling
tortfeasor recovery on a contribution claim measured by the amount of the
victim's damages. On appeal, the third circuit correctly held that recovery on the
contribution claim should be limited to the amount paid in settlement of the
plaintiff's claim.34 Under Civil Code article 1830, legal subrogation permits the
subrogee to recover only "to the extent of the performance rendered to the
original obligee." The subrogee "may not recover more by invoking convention-
al subrogation."35 Consistent with this principle, Article 2652 provides that the
conventional assignment of a litigious right provides the assignee the right to
recover no more than the "price the assignee paid for the assignment, with
interest from the time of the assignment. '36  Hence, in the personal injury
context, the quantum of the victim's damages is normally not at issue in the
post-settlement contribution action. The action need address only the respective
percentages of the joint tortfeasors' fault so that their "virile portions" of the
payment rendered may be determined in accordance with Article 1804." 7
VI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 2324 AND LEGAL SUBROGATION
PRINCIPLES
The "limited solidarity" rules of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B) may
create an additional pitfall for tortfeasors seeking to retain contribution rights
following settlement. By limiting the solidary portion of tort obligations to "fifty
percent of [the] recoverable damages," the Article arguably curtails the
contribution rights of settling tortfeasors. It might be argued that because
contribution stems from legal subrogation, and because the source of this legal
subrogation is solidarity, restricting solidarity must also restrict contribution.
Though the argument likely will not withstand analysis, particularly since Article
2324(B) provides that "[u]nder the provisions of this Article, all parties shall
enjoy their respective rights of indemnity and contribution," it is yet another twist
32. 616 So. 2d at 1370-71.
33. Id. at 1371.
34. Id.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
36. The obvious policy behind these codal articles is the traditional prohibition against speculation
in litigious rights, otherwise known as champerty.
37. See Ducote, 616 So. 2d at 1371-72, for a discussion of this point.
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on the already tortuous road toward maintaining contribution rights following
settlement.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Judge Rubin concluded in Diggs v. Hood:
Apparently complex legal questions may sometimes be resolved by
principles as elementary as those Sherlock Holmes postulated to "My
dear Watson." The right to contribution exists only in favor of a party
who has paid what someone else owes. Unless the payment discharges
all or a part of the debt of the person from whom contribution is sought,
there is no debt to be repaid and no liability for contribution.3"
This simple principle resolves the legal issues discussed in this article, but the
"partial release" decisions seem to have overlooked it. The resulting confusion
in the jurisprudence prevents settling parties from preserving their rights of
contribution without substantial risk and uncertainty. It is respectfully submitted
that the Louisiana Supreme Court should accept the next invitation to address
and resolve these issues. When doing so, the court should keep in mind basic
Civil Code principles of subrogation and contribution.
38. 772 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 1985).
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